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INTRODUCTION
James Madison, writing in Federalist No. 10, observed the
difference between a republic and a pure democracy.1 Whereas a
republic consists of a scheme of representative governance utilizing
a deliberative process to legislate, a pure democracy gives legislative
power directly to the public.2 The Constitution embraces representa-
tive governance at the federal level3 and also guarantees it to the
states.4 Yet with the increased prevalence of direct democratic
measures, such as ballot initiatives and referendums, the structural
lines between a republican government and a direct democratic gov-
ernment are being blurred, producing both structural and pragmatic
consequences for state governments.
The most telling examples of these consequences occur in
California. The state has recently endured difficult fiscal times,
including a $42 billion budgetary shortfall for the 2009-2010 fiscal
year, the worst bond rating of any state in the nation, and an
unemployment rate hovering around 11 percent.5 California voters
overwhelmingly rejected ballot measures seeking to ease the
budgetary gap between spending and revenue,6 which forced the
legislature to make significant funding cuts for social programs and
education.7 The state even went so far as to enact budgetary cuts to
1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 57-60 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898).
2. Id. at 57-58; see also Glen Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth of Popular Sovereignty and
Applying the Agency Model to Direct Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REV. 395, 402-03 (2003) (noting
that the republican system of government that the Framers designed ensures that laws will
be enacted through “thoughtful deliberation by elected representatives” and protects the
legislative process from the whims of factions by including “a system of separated powers with
checks and balances, including bicameralism and presentment”). 
3. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1-3 (granting all legislative power to a bifurcated
legislature composed of elected representatives).
4. Id. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government.”).
5. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, State of Paralysis, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2009, at A19; The
Ungovernable State, ECONOMIST, May 16, 2009, at 33-36.
6. Jennifer Steinhauer, California Voters Reject Measures To Keep State Solvent, N.Y.
TIMES, May 20, 2009, at A22.
7. California cut its K-12 education budget by approximately $6.5 billion, its higher
education budget by approximately $2 billion, its health budget by approximately $2.3 billion,
and its social services budget by approximately $1 billion. Assemb. B. 1D, 2009-10 Assemb.,
4th Extraordinary Sess. (Cal. 2009); LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, JULY 2009 BUDGET
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the prison system—a reduction that could provide approximately
16,000 convicted felons with an early release date.8
The Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court, Ronald M.
George, recently linked California’s budgetary and governance
problems to its constitutional structure.9 In particular, Chief Justice
George pointed out that “California’s lawmakers, and the state
itself, have been placed in a fiscal straitjacket”10 by the state’s
reliance on the referendum and voter initiative processes.11 The
“fiscal straightjacket” to which the Chief Justice refers12 is a
combination of two state constitutional amendments that restrict
the legislature’s ability to raise revenue and pass a budget.13
Although other states have similar budgetary or revenue restric-
tions, California is the only state to have both.14 The current state
PACKAGE 2-3 (2009), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/2009/bud/july_09_budget_package/
July_2009_Budget_Package_072909.pdf; see also Jennifer Steinhaer, Governor Signs Budget
in California, with Trims, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2009, at A10.
8. California cut its penal budget by approximately $1.2 billion dollars and enacted other
changes to reduce the prison population by 37,000 inmates within two years. See Assemb. B.
1D, 2009-10 Assemb., 4th Extraordinary Sess. (Cal. 2009); Sen. B. 18C, 2009-10 Assemb., 3d
Extraordinary Sess. (Cal. 2009) (enacted); LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at
2; see also Solomon Moore, California Passes Bill Addressing Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13,
2009, at A33 (noting a reduction in the prison budget by over $1 billion dollars and the early
release of approximately 16,000 inmates); Michael Rothfeld, Prison Cuts Easier Said Than
Done, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2009, at A1 (reporting that California’s budget crisis could lead to
the release of 40,000 inmates).
9. See generally Ronald M. George, Chief Justice, Cal. Supreme Court, The Perils of
Direct Democracy: The California Experience, Address Before the American Academy of Arts
and Sciences (Oct. 10, 2009), available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/pdf/aaaspeech.pdf
[hereinafter Chief Justice George].
10. Id. This Note focuses on the impact of ballot initiatives, which circumvent the
legislature by relying on plebiscites. It does not focus on referendums, which go through the
legislative process and are approved by an electorate vote. For a more thorough description
of the various types of direct democratic mechanisms, see Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of
Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1510-12 (1990). 
11. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. II, §§ 8-9 (providing citizens of California with the power to
amend the state constitution or propose statutes by way of ballot initiative or voter
referendum).
12. Chief Justice George, supra note 9.
13. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII A, § 3 (requiring a two-thirds supermajority vote of both
chambers of the California legislature to increase taxes); id. art. IV, § 12(D) (requiring a two-
thirds supermajority vote of both chambers of the legislature to pass a budget).
14. See Sanford Levinson, “I Read the News Today, Oh Boy”: The Increasing Centrality of
Constitutional Design, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1265-66 (2009) (noting that thirteen states
currently have constitutional provisions requiring a supermajority vote for the passage of a
tax increase, and only three states—California, Rhode Island, and Arkansas—have a
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of the California budgetary process, which is arguably the result of
the institutional framework that ballot initiatives have placed on
the legislature, highlights the pragmatic consequences that unre-
strained direct democracy can have on the governance of a state.15
With less prohibitive budgetary and revenue-raising restrictions,
other states are able to implement a wider variety of solutions to
budgetary shortfalls. California, however, is forced to solve its
budgetary problems with its hands tied.
Although the effects of ballot initiatives may be most visible in
California, eighteen states—predominantly western states—cur-
rently allow citizens to amend their state constitutions with a ballot
initiative.16 This delegation of legislative power from the state
legislature to the unelected citizenry reflects the Populist and
Progressive movements against party machines and corporate
trusts, which were often associated with seemingly corrupt political
officials in the West at the turn of the twentieth century.17 
Despite their legislative function, ballot initiatives are often held
to a different standard of judicial review than measures passed by
state legislatures.18 Absent constitutional violations, California
and other state courts are typically extremely deferential to the will
of the people as reflected in a ballot initiative.19 Yet the highly
supermajority requirement for the passage of the budget).
15. Voters in California have amended the California Constitution on numerous other
occasions to restrict the amount of revenue that may be accumulated from various sources.
Article XIII, section 3, for example, which is a result of voter amendments on two separate
occasions, provides over eighteen different property tax exemptions. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, §
22 (limiting the amount of property taxes the state may raise per year; adopted by voter
approval in 1974); id. art. XIII A, § 1 (capping property taxes at one percent of the value of the
property; approved by Proposition 13, a ballot initiative). 
16. William B. Fisch, Constitutional Referendum in the United States of America, 54 AM.
J. COMP. L. (SUPPLEMENT) 485, 496 (2006).
17. See Nathaniel A. Persily, The Peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy: Why the
Initiative, Referendum, and Recall Developed in the American West, 2 MICH. L. & POL’Y REV.
11, 21-30 (1997); see also Dennis Polhill, Democracy’s Journey, in THE BATTLE OVER CITIZEN
LAWMAKING 5, 8-10 (M. Dane Waters ed., 2001) (providing an overview and timeline of the
development of direct democracy).
18. See, e.g., Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc. v. Kritz, 170 P.3d 183, 192-93 (Alaska
2007) (describing the different standards used to interpret legislatively enacted statutes and
voter-enacted statutes).
19. See, e.g., Swetzof v. Philemonoff, 203 P.3d 471, 474-75 (Alaska 2009) (noting that the
court “construe[s] voter initiatives broadly so as to preserve them whenever possible” (quoting
City of Fairbanks v. Fairbanks Convention & Visitors Bureau, 818 P.2d 1153, 1155 (Alaska
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deferential method of reviewing initiative activities seems to run
contrary to the Framers’ vision of the courts as a check on the
legislature.20 Indeed, given the increased use of ballot initiatives by
well-financed special interests,21 Madison’s warning of the dangers
that factions pose to effective governance becomes increasingly per-
tinent.22
Additionally, the substituted use of the ballot initiative process
for legislative purposes presents fundamental structural problems
with the republican form of government envisioned by the Framers
and reflected in the Guarantee Clause of the U.S. Constitution.23
Although it is settled law that the Guarantee Clause itself poses a
nonjusticiable political question,24 its inclusion in the Constitution
1991))); Citizens for Planning Responsibility v. County of San Louis Obispo, 97 Cal. Rptr. 3d
636, 642 (Ct. App. 2009) (noting that direct democratic measures must be given
“extraordinarily broad deference” because “[t]he state constitutional right of initiative or
referendum is one of the most precious rights of our democratic process”); Zingale v. Powell,
885 So. 2d 277, 282 (Fla. 2004) (stating that a referendum or initiative “provision must be
construed or interpreted in such manner as to fulfill the intent of the people, never to defeat
it” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Gray v. Bryant, 125 So. 2d 846, 852 (Fla. 1960))).
20. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 424-31 (addressing
the concept of judicial review, Hamilton stated that “[a] Constitution is, in fact, and must be,
regarded by the Judges as a fundamental law. It must therefore belong to them to ascertain
its meaning as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the Legislative
body.”) (emphasis added); see also James G. Wilson, The Role of Public Opinion in
Constitutional Interpretation, 1993 BYU L. REV. 1037, 1059-60 (noting that the structural
purpose of “independent Courts” in the constitutional scheme was partially to “protect the
Constitution from temporary majorities reflecting prevailing public opinion”).
21. See, e.g., Jesse McKinley & Kirk Johnson, Mormons Tipped Scale in Ban on Gay
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2008, at A1 (describing the influence and effect of special
interest money on the 2008 same-sex marriage ballot initiative in California). See generally
Elizabeth Garrett & Elisabeth R. Gerber, Money in the Initiative and Referendum Process:
Evidence of Its Effects and Prospects for Reform, in THE BATTLE OVER CITIZEN LAWMAKING,
supra note 17, at 73-96.
22. Accord Staszewski, supra note 2, at 401-03 (describing the “[t]ension” between direct
democratic measures and the representative constitutional structure set forth by the
Framers); see THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 53-60.
23. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government.”).
24. This Note is not advocating that courts should overturn ballot initiatives on a
Guarantee Clause rationale. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849) (holding that
Guarantee Clause claims are nonjusticiable political questions). But see New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 185 (1992) (suggesting “that perhaps not all claims under the Guarantee
Clause present nonjusticiable questions”). 
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was the result of a much-debated and deliberate decision on the
structure of government at both the federal and state levels.25
This Note argues that the scope of ballot initiatives should be
limited in substance to matters that are not essential government
functions. California’s Constitution imposes similar restrictions on
referendums, forbidding their use for “urgency statutes, statutes
calling elections, and statutes providing for tax levies or appropria-
tions for usual current expenses of the State.”26 These restrictions
on referendums provide a framework by which restrictions on ballot
initiatives could be framed.
First, courts could institute a heightened standard of review for
ballot initiatives that deal with essential matters of governance.
Such a review should be one in which the courts are cognizant of the
Framers’ intent to preserve a republican form of government.
Although this heightened review is not a call for litigants to
challenge ballot initiatives on a Guarantee Clause rationale, it is a
call for courts to look for guidance from the principles of republican
governance that the Framers embraced. In order to prevent direct
democratic measures from usurping the republican form of govern-
ment, courts should employ an “essential government functions”
exception to their typically deferential standard of review of ballot
initiatives.27
The second—and perhaps more easily implemented—way that
states could limit ballot initiatives is to adopt constitutional
provisions that restrict ballot initiatives in the same way that
California currently restricts referendums.28 These constitutional
provisions would place important limits on the scope of ballot
initiatives by restricting them to matters that are not of essential
importance to the governance of the state. This type of restriction,
25. See, e.g., NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY JAMES
MADISON 320-22 (Adrienne Koch ed., 1966) [hereinafter MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES]
(reporting a debate about the Guarantee Clause at the Constitutional Convention involving,
among others, Edmund Randolph, James Wilson, Gouverneur Morris, and James Madison).
26. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 9(a).
27. See Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Initiative and Referendum: The Trials of Direct
Democracy, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1003, 1023 (2007) (“Judges have been compelled to weigh the
permissible scope of an intrusive direct democracy against prohibitions intended to protect
essential government functions from excessive interference detrimental to the public
welfare.”).
28. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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while still allowing ballot initiatives that address social issues of
concern to citizens,29 is most consistent with the Framers’ vision of
a republican form of government for the states. Furthermore, it
aims to prevent many of the pragmatic consequences resulting from
state legislatures’ inability to yield a full range of governance tools
as a result of direct democratic measures.30 
Part I of this Note traces the Framers’ deliberations regarding the
necessity of a republican scheme of government. By examining both
the deliberations that occurred during the Constitutional Conven-
tion and the post-Convention debates between the Federalists and
Antifederalists, it becomes clear that the Framers expressly rejected
direct democratic measures at both the state and federal levels in
favor of a representative republican government. Part II describes
the current treatment of ballot initiatives in California. Because of
the state’s widespread use of ballot initiatives, California presents
the best example of the dysfunction that these initiatives cause in
government. Lastly, Part III describes a way to remedy this dys-
function: excepting essential government functions from the reach
of ballot initiatives. This exception addresses both the structural
and pragmatic problems that unfettered use of ballot initiatives
create and provides states with a greater ability to address legisla-
tive problems through the legislative process, as the Framers in-
tended.
29. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5 (demonstrating a social issue ballot initiative,
Proposition 8, which amended the California Constitution to recognize those marriages
consisting of only one man and one woman). But see Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp.
2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding Proposition 8 and the subsequent constitutional amendment
unconstitutional in violation of both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the U.S.
Constitution).
30. See Chief Justice George, supra note 9. Because such effects—both structural and
pragmatic—are most visible in California, this Note will focus primarily on that state.
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I. THE FRAMERS’ REJECTION OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY FOR THE
FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS
A. The Constitutional Convention of 1787 and the Importance of
the Guarantee Clause
The members of the 1787 Constitutional Convention were
articulate and adamant in their intent to create a republican form
of government at both the federal and state levels.31 This inten-
tion is reflected in the transcripts of the debates surrounding the
merits of the Guarantee Clause.32 For instance, Daniel Carroll, a
delegate from Maryland,33 argued that a guarantee to the states of
a republican government was an “essential” component of the new
Constitution: “[e]very State ought to wish for it.”34 His colleague
Edmund Randolph, a delegate from Virginia,35 moved the Conven-
tion to include language stating that “no State be at liberty to form
any other than a Republican Gov[ernment].”36 James Madison
seconded this motion.37 
The Convention’s debates further make clear the Framers’ fear
that, without a republican guarantee to the states, citizens could
institute a form of government that was repugnant to the republican
values the Framers hoped to institute.38 This fear reflected their
knowledge of the government of Georgia, which, in 1777, was the
first state to include a constitutional provision providing citizens
31. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; see Thomas C. Berg, Comment, The Guarantee of Republican
Government: Proposals for Judicial Review, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 208, 226-30 (1987) (describing
the Framers’ intent for states to possess republican styles of government). 
32. See MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 25, at 320-22; Hans A. Linde, Practicing
Theory: The Forgotten Law of Initiative Lawmaking, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1735, 1747 (1998)
(arguing that the Guarantee Clause “was designed as a legal requirement for statehood in the
Union”).
33. MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 25, at 256.
34. Id. at 321.
35. Id. at 323.
36. Id. at 322.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 321. Nathaniel Gorham, a delegate from Massachusetts, warned that, absent
the Guarantee Clause, “an enterprising Citizen might erect the standard of Monarchy in a
particular State, might gather together partizans [sic] from all quarters, might extend his
views.” Id.
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with the ability to modify the state constitution through the citizen
initiative process.39 The delegates at the Constitutional Convention
expressly discussed this fact, and William Houston of Georgia was
“afraid of perpetuating the existing Constitutions of the States”
without the guarantee of a republican government.40
The delegates’ debate about the meaning and necessity of the
second half of the Guarantee Clause41 also reflected their fears.
During this discussion, some delegates argued that “the object is
merely to secure the States [against] dangerous commotions,
insurrections and rebellions.”42 Edmund Randolph objected to this
interpretation, and pointedly noted that the Guarantee Clause has
“[two] objects. [First,] to secure Republican Government. [Secondly,]
to suppress domestic commotions.”43 He “urged the necessity of both
of these provisions.”44 Randolph’s broader definition—incorporating
the necessity of a republican government in the states—has been a
focus of the Supreme Court’s Guarantee Clause jurisprudence,
particularly within the context of challenges to direct democratic
institutions.45 
B. The Federalist v. Antifederalist Debates
The debates among the Framers regarding the validity and
necessity of guaranteeing a republican form of government to the
states did not stop at the Convention’s conclusion; the Guarantee
Clause was a visible topic of both the Federalist Papers and the
Antifederalists Papers. The Antifederalists were vocal in their
39. See Fisch, supra note 16, at 488, 494. When Georgia modified its constitution in 1789,
however, the provision was removed. Id. at 494. Massachusetts was the first state to utilize
a direct democratic process when adopting its constitution. Id. at 488.
40. MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 25, at 321.
41. The second clause of the Guarantee Clause states: “and [the United States] shall
protect each of them [the states] against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or
of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.” U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 4.
42. MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 25, at 321 (noting the opinion of James
Wilson, delegate from Pennsylvania). 
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42-43 (1849) (discussing the importance
of the Guarantee Clause).
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opposition to a republican form of government in the states.46 For
example, John DeWitt called the republican theory of government
a “faithful [m]irror” that will result in an entrenched aristocracy
taxing the people at will.47 James Winthrop echoed this sentiment
when he argued that republics naturally evolve into “aristo-
craticks,”48 the formation of which permitted the nobles in the
country to consolidate power and take it away from the people.49
Indeed, the sentiment that a republican government would result
in a legislature too far removed from the people was one of the
Antifederalists’ central concerns.50 Arguing that republican govern-
ments naturally transcend into “democraticks,” the Antifederalists
were weary of the republican form of representative democracy.51 In
particular, a republican government could work only on a theoreti-
cal level when “the body of the people are virtuous, and where
property is ... equally divided.”52 Without these ideals present in the
public, the republican government transforms into monarchy or
aristocracy.53 The Antifederalists’ solution was one of simplicity: a
more direct democracy. A simpler form of government—such as one
in which the people are less removed from the legislative activities
of the government—offered the best protection against the dangers
of consolidated power.54
46. See Gordon S. Wood, Introduction to THE ANTIFEDERALISTS xvi, cvi-cvii (Cecelia M.
Kenyon ed., 1966); see also James Winthrop, Agrippa, XV, MASS. GAZETTE, Jan. 2, 1788,
reprinted in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, PUBLISHED DURING ITS
DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788, at 108 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1892) (discussing
concerns about state legislatures abusing their powers).
47. John DeWitt, Essay III (Nov. 5, 1787), reprinted in THE ANTIFEDERALISTS, supra note
46, at 102, 108-09. It is unclear who wrote under the pseudonym John DeWitt. THE
ANTIFEDERALISTS, supra note 46, at 89.
48. Winthrop, supra note 46, at 105. James Winthrop was an Antifederalist from
Massachusetts. Wood, supra note 46, at xxi, xxxix.
49. See Wood, supra note 46, at xxi, xxxix.
50. James Winthrop, Agrippa, IV, MASS. GAZETTE, Dec. 3, 1787, reprinted in ESSAYS ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE,
1787-1788, supra note 46, at 63-64 (noting that a republic would yield “laws not being made
by the people, who felt the inconveniences, [and] did not suit their circumstances”).
51. See Winthrop, supra note 46, at 546.
52. Bryan, Centinel No. 1, INDEP. GAZETTEER, Oct. 5, 1787, reprinted in THE
ANTIFEDERALISTS, supra note 46, at 1.
53. Id. at 6-7.
54. See id. This argument for greater direct participation by the general public in the
legislative activities of the state was embraced during the Progressive Era by the early
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In contrast, the Federalists pointed to several ways that the
proposed republican constitution protected the people from the
dangers inherent in a direct democracy.55 Madison, for example,
articulated his warnings of the dangers of factions during the
Convention debate,56 and famously reiterated them in Federalist
No. 10.57 This danger of “pure democracy,” he wrote, was that a
“common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a
majority of the whole ... and there is nothing to check the induce-
ments to sacrifice the weaker party, or an obnoxious individual.”58
To Madison, the republican form of government best protected the
rights of the minority from abuses of the majority, such as the
“artful misrepresentations of interested men” or the “irregular
passion[s]” of a majority.59 The republican government was fash-
ioned, he argued, to protect the citizenry against the “shortcomings
of human nature” that would dominate in simple majority rule.60
C. The Final Rejection of Direct Democracy
The decision to utilize a republican form of government, at both
the federal and state levels, reflected the Framers’ intent to limit
proponents of the ballot initiative and adopted by many western states. See Persily, supra
note 17, at 21 (describing the progressive movement towards greater use of direct democratic
measures as representing a “[p]ower to the people” ideology). The central goal of instituting
direct democratic measures was to remove the influence of powerful “party machines and
corporate trusts” that dominated the political process. Id. at 22. But see Fisch, supra note 16,
at 497 (noting that the high cost of placing an initiative on the ballot suggests that the ballot
initiative system is available to only well-funded special interest groups).
55. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 57.
56. See MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 25, at 76 (issuing a warning during the
Convention that “[a]ll civilized Societies would be divided into different Sects, Factions &
interests ... of rich & poor, debtors & creditors ... the disciples of this religious Sect or that
religious Sect ... [indicating that] the rights of the minority are in danger”).
57. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 57 (“When a majority
is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to
sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest, both the public good and the rights of other
citizens.”).
58. Id.
59. THE FEDERALIST NO. 63 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 347 (noting that the
“interference of some temperate and respectable body of citizens” would “check the misguided
career, and ... suspend the blow meditated by the people against themselves, until reason,
justice, and truth can regain their authority over the public mind”).
60. Dan T. Cohen, A Rhetoric for Ratification: The Argument of The Federalist and Its
Impact on Constitutional Interpretation, 56 DUKE L.J. 469, 492-93 (2006).
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the dangers of factionalism or unrestrained populism that may
occur in more direct democratic institutions.61 It also ensured the
“enlarge[ment] [of] the public views, by passing them through the
medium of a chosen body of citizens,”62 and guaranteed that repre-
sentatives would best be able to discern what was truly of the public
good, as opposed to simply a majority rule where minority interests
would be at risk to oppression by prevailing public opinion.63 As
evidenced by the inclusion of the Guarantee Clause in the proposed
constitution, the Framers believed that republicanism, as a struc-
ture of government, was important at both the federal and state
levels.64 Addressing arguments alleging that the Guarantee Clause
presented fundamental federalism problems—notably that the
federal government was free to force the states into a particular
structure of government65—Madison noted that “[t]he only restric-
tion imposed on [the states], is that they shall not exchange repub-
lican for anti-republican Constitutions; a restriction which ... will
hardly be considered as a grievance.”66 This argument suggests that
there is latitude for states to choose their own form of government,
so long as the chosen form comports to republican principles.67 
Further, because all the states had republican governments
before the ratification of the Constitution, the Guarantee Clause
61. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 57 (noting that societies
that employed a more direct democratic organization were often plagued with “spectacles of
turbulence and contention ... incompatible with personal security, or the rights of property”). 
62. Id. at 58.
63. Id.; cf. Wilson, supra note 20, at 1059-60 (describing the countermajoritarian
structural role the courts play on the majority’s prevailing public opinion).
64. But see Robert G. Natelson, A Republic, Not a Democracy? Initiative, Referendum, and
the Constitution’s Guarantee Clause, 80 TEX. L. REV. 807, 856 (2002) (describing the basic
elements of republicanism as “control by the citizenry, the absence of a monarch, and the rule
of law,” and arguing that a “government is republican for constitutional purposes, whether
the legislative power is vested in representatives exclusively, in the people exclusively, or, as
is the case in most states today, in some combination thereof ”).
65. See A Manifesto of a Number of Gentlemen from Albany County, N.Y. J. & WKLY. REG.,
Apr. 26, 1788, reprinted in THE ANTIFEDERALISTS, supra note 46, at 359, 363 (arguing that the
Guarantee Clause “left [the states] at the mercy of the general government, to allow them
such a form as they shall deem proper”).
66. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 242. 
67. See William T. Mayton, Direct Democracy, Federalism & the Guarantee Clause, 2
GREEN BAG 2d 269, 271-72 (1999) (discussing the notion that the Guarantee Clause gives
states wide latitude to experiment in systems of governance within the republican
framework).
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represented a mutual agreement between the federal and state
governments: “the states have an a priori duty to furnish a republi-
can form of government to their citizenries while the federal gov-
ernment has a responsibility to safeguard the existence of republi-
can governments across the Union.”68 The Supreme Court embraced
this interpretation when it wrote in 1874 that the Guarantee Clause
“implies a duty on the part of the States themselves to provide such
a government.”69
II. CURRENT STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: A PERSPECTIVE
FROM CALIFORNIA
An analysis of the current standards by which courts review
direct democratic measures—ballot initiatives in particular—
reveals a highly deferential treatment.70 Much of the deference
accorded to ballot initiatives is based in the deep-seated belief that
the electorate holds a reserved legislative power that is equal to or
greater than that of the legislature.71 A review of the treatment of
direct democratic measures by California courts demonstrates this
highly deferential treatment. 
68. Edward A. Stelzer, Bearing the Judicial Mantle: State Court Enforcement of the
Guarantee Clause, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 889 (1993) (emphasis omitted).
69. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 175 (1874).
70. See, e.g., Citizens for Planning Responsibly v. County of San Luis Obispo, 97 Cal. Rptr.
3d 636, 642 (Ct. App. 2009) (noting a “long-established rule of according extraordinarily broad
deference to the electorate’s power to enact laws by initiative”). This deference is particularly
prevalent in state court settings; a federal court is more likely to invalidate a direct
democratic measure than a state court. See Mads Qvortrup, The Courts v. The People: An
Essay on Judicial Review of Initiatives, in THE BATTLE OVER CITIZEN LAWMAKING, supra note
17, at 197, 200; see also Jones v. Bates, 127 F.3d 839, 857 (9th Cir. 1997) (describing federal
rules interpreting ballot initiatives as “a different and more stringent inquiry”).
71. See, e.g., Rossi v. Brown, 889 P.2d 557, 560 (Cal. 1995) (“The initiative and referendum
are not rights granted the people, but ... power[s] reserved by them. Declaring it the duty of
the courts to jealously guard this right of the people, the courts have described the initiative
and referendum as articulating one of the most precious rights of our democratic process.”
(quoting Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 557
P.2d 473, 477 (Cal. 1976))).
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A. Statutory Controls and Court Restrictions on Ballot Initiatives
Before examining how California courts treat ballot initiatives, it
must be noted that California currently imposes several restrictions
on ballot initiatives during judicial review. First, several state
constitutional provisions limit the validity of ballot initiatives. A
ballot initiative may neither name an individual or corporation to
office nor address more than one singular subject per initiative.72
Additionally, a petition must be presented to the California
Attorney General prior to being placed on the ballot as an initi-
ative.73 These statutory restrictions, although relatively minimalist
and predominantly procedural, are common among states that
incorporate ballot initiatives into their systems of governance.74
Second, California courts have limited the scope of ballot initi-
atives to legislative acts: “those which declare a public purpose.”75
Administrative and executive acts, therefore, are outside the reach
of ballot initiatives.76 The initiative must also be a constitutional
legislative exercise, particularly when fundamental rights are the
subject matter of the initiative.77 Lastly, California courts impose a
de minimis requirement of comprehensibility on the legislative
measures.78 Interpreting California initiative law, the Ninth Circuit
wrote that “it is enough for purposes of interpreting the meaning of
the measure that the ‘average’ voter ‘likely’ understood the mea-
sure.”79
72. CAL. CONST. art. II, §§ 8(d), 12.
73. Id. § 10(d).
74. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-101 to -143 (2010) (describing the procedural,
form, and substance requirements for direct democratic measures).
75. See Citizens for Planning Responsibly, 97 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 642 (differentiating
legislative acts, defined above, from administrative acts, which are “sometimes called
adjudicative or quasi-adjudicative” and which “implement the steps necessary to carry out
that legislative purpose”).
76. Id.
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B. Deferential Treatment of Direct Democratic Measures by the
California Courts and Beyond
In light of these restrictions, state courts in California begin with
the premise that the reserved powers of initiative and referendum
are either “greater than the power of the legislative body”80 or
“generally coextensive with the power of the [l]egislature to enact
statutes.”81 Thus, the judiciary promotes the inherent power of
ballot initiatives by providing them with a presumption of validity.82
This presumption gives courts the justification to “liberally con-
strue[ ]” the people’s initiative powers to best promote the initiative
system.83 Indeed, a recent California appellate court reaffirmed this
principle when it wrote that it had a “duty to ... construe the
relevant constitutional provisions liberally in favor of the people’s
right to exercise the powers of initiative and referendum.”84 
Perhaps the most glaring instance of court deference regarding
ballot initiatives arises when the courts construe initiatives that
contain ambiguous language. One recent California appellate court
case discussed this deference at length, comparing the standards of
judicial interpretation for ambiguous legislative enactments with
those for ballot initiatives.85 Describing the means by which the
court will interpret ambiguous statutes enacted by the legislature,
the court declared: 
An interpreting court must go behind a statute’s language when
it is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation. To
decipher the purpose of an ambiguous statute, a court may
consider the ostensible objects to be achieved by the statute, the
statutory scheme of which the statute is a part, the evils to be
80. Citizens for Planning Responsibly, 97 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 651.
81. Prof’l Eng’rs in Cal. Gov’t v. Kempton, 155 P.3d 226, 243 (Cal. 2007) (quoting Santa
Clara County Local Transp. Auth. v. Guardino, 902 P.2d 225 (Cal. 1995)).
82. See Jones, 127 F.3d at 857 (construing California initiative law). 
83. Legislature v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1309, 1313 (Cal. 1991) (emphasis omitted); see also
Citizens for Planning Responsibly, 97 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 642.
84. Citizens for Planning Responsibly, 97 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 642.
85. AB Cellular LA, L.L.C. v. City of Los Angeles, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 295, 301 (Ct. App.
2007).
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remedied, public policy, the legislative history, and the wider
historical circumstances of the enactment.86
In the next paragraph, however, the court pointed to a different
standard of review that it utilizes when interpreting ballot initia-
tives. Contending that the review is “fairly proximate to statutory
construction,” the court noted that the interpretation “must be
delivered in a liberal and practical manner so it will meet changed
conditions and the growing needs of the people.”87 On the one hand,
this standard allows a court to interpret a ballot initiative broadly,
giving effect to the will of the electorate. On the other hand, the
court may interpret the initiative so as to remedy its deficiencies,
eschewing the spoken will of the people in order to meet the court’s
perceived notion of the changing and growing intentions of the
people.88 
This method of interpretation reaches beyond merely going
behind a statute’s language as required in the case of an ambiguous
legislative statute, and leaves the court open to the accusation that
it is legislating from the bench.89 The court attempted to guard
against the dangers of its own interpretation by noting that the
“literal language of enactments may be disregarded to avoid absurd
results.”90 Moreover, the courts may examine “contemporaneous
construction of the [l]egislature or the administrative agencies that
are responsible” for interpreting the statutes.91 Even with these
additional interpretative restrictions, however, regulations set forth
by initiative enjoy a less rigorous gauntlet of judicial review. 
86. Id.
87. Id. at 302 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
88. Id.
89. See Viet D. Dinh, Threats to Judicial Independence, Real and Imagined, 95 GEO. L.J.
929, 940 (2007) (“[I]t remains the role of the legislature to legislate, and the Judiciary to
interpret. An activist court legislates from the bench, and thus, encroaches on the legislature’s
constitutional turf. Legislating from the bench destroys the proper end of judging.”)
(quotations and citations omitted). Charges of judicial activism have been leveled against the
California court system in the past. See, e.g., Chantale Fiebig, Note, Legislating from the
Bench: Judicial Activism in California and Its Increasing Impact on Adult Prison Reform, 3
STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 131, 133 (2007).
90. AB Cellular, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 302 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281, 1300
(1978)).
91. Id.
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A different standard of review for direct democratic measures and
legislatively passed measures is not unique to California. The
Alaska Supreme Court, for example, explicitly stated that “we take
a slightly different approach when interpreting initiatives enacted
by the voters” than with legislatively passed enactments.92 This
inconsistent treatment of legislative measures—based solely on the
source of the measure—once again appears to be the result of courts
holding that the “people’s reserved power of initiative [is] greater
than the power of the state’s legislative body.”93
  III. AN ESSENTIAL GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS EXCEPTION TO   
BALLOT INITIATIVES EMBRACES THE FRAMERS’ REPUBLICAN IDEALS
The debate surrounding the proper standard of judicial review of
ballot initiatives and direct democratic measures spans the
spectrum from strict scrutiny,94 to a standard of review based on the
haste by which the measure was proposed and passed,95 to a more
lenient standard of review that presumes the validity of ballot
initiatives.96 Part III.A enters this debate by proposing a new alter-
native: a standard of review—or statutory equivalent—that exempts
essential government functions from the reach of ballot initiatives.
Not only does this exemption further the Framers’ intent to
establish a republican form of government, it also avoids many of
the pragmatic and structural deficiencies that accompany more
permissive standards of review.
92. Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc. v. Kritz, 170 P.3d 183, 192 (Alaska 2007).
93. Rossi v. Brown, 889 P.2d 557, 574 (Cal. 1995).
94. See, e.g., Mihui Pak, The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty in Focus: Judicial Review
of Initiatives, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 237, 273 (1999) (advocating for a strict scrutiny
standard of judicial review for ballot initiatives because empirical evidence suggests that
“people do not vote, are uninformed, and miscast their votes, [so] judges seem better situated
and more knowledgeable in evaluating the law”).
95. See, e.g., John Copeland Nagle, Direct Democracy and Hastily Enacted Statutes, 1
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 163, 179-81 (1997).
96. See, e.g., Jones v. Bates, 127 F.3d 839, 857 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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A. Pragmatic Consequences of Unrestricted Ballot Initiatives
1. Limiting Legislatures’ Ability To Solve Fiscal Crises
To illustrate the necessity of an essential government functions
exception to ballot initiatives as a protection against unintended
consequences, consider California’s law regarding the use of direct
democratic measures to affect tax regulations and the pragmatic
consequences of the court’s treatment of these initiatives. The
California Constitution bars the usage of referendums for “urgency
statutes, statutes calling elections, and statutes providing for tax
levies or appropriations for usual current expenses of the state,” yet
places no such restrictions on the use of ballot initiatives.97 Because
voters may still use their referendum power for social issues or
other legislative issues not related to the taxation of the state, the
ballot initiative provides the general public with the means by
which it may tie the legislature’s revenue-raising hands. This
unrestricted use of ballot initiatives on the finances of the state is
problematic given the complexity and multitude of economic issues
that may be decided on a single vote by a potentially uninformed
electorate.98 
In 1995, the California Supreme Court upheld the distinction
between the seemingly absolute power of ballot initiatives and the
restrained power of referendums.99 In Rossi v. Brown, the court
embraced the plenary power of ballot initiatives and warned that
any restrictions on the initiative power to restrain taxation—such
as the way in which referendums are restrained—“strikes at the
very root of popular self-government.”100 In addition to the historical
justification for this unrestrained citizen initiative power, the court
offered a pragmatic justification for the differentiation between
initiatives and referendums concerning tax measures: whereas it is
necessary to exempt tax measures from the referendum power in
97. Compare CAL. CONST. art. II, § 9(a) (restricting the referendum power), with CAL.
CONST. art. II, § 8(a) (setting forth no equivalent restrictions on the state initiative power).
98. K.K. DuVivier, Fast-Food Government and Physician-Assisted Death: The Role of
Direct Democracy in Federalism, 86 OR. L. REV. 895, 908-09 (2007).
99. See Rossi v. Brown, 889 P.2d 557, 588 (Cal. 1995).
100. Id. at 564. The court also noted that “[p]ractically all historic struggles for liberty,
including ... our own American revolution, have centered about the question of the people’s
control over taxation.” Id. (citation omitted).
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order to “prevent the disruption of [the state’s] operations by inter-
ferences with the administration of its fiscal powers and policies,”
citizen initiatives that affect the tax structure of the state “will
rarely affect the current budgetary process.”101 The short-sighted-
ness of this analysis is obvious, and a simple hypothetical that takes
the court’s logic to its natural end can illustrate its folly: Imagine a
ballot initiative that seeks to forbid any state income tax, state sales
tax, or property tax in all fiscal years following the current one.
Under the court’s analysis in Rossi, the court would not take issue
with such a restriction despite the fact that it may significantly
disrupt the state’s fiscal operation; as long as the initiative does not
affect the “current budgetary process,”102 an initiative is a proper
vehicle to bring such a sweeping governmental change.
2. The Increased Influence of Special Interest Groups
Another pragmatic consequence of a deferential standard of
review of direct democratic measures is that what Madison referred
to as “factions” can essentially control the ballot initiative process.103
The use of ballot initiatives, and their success, depends largely upon
the amount of private money spent promoting the initiative.104
Again, examining California’s initiative system, data reflecting the
101. Id. at 566.
102. Id. (emphasis added).
103. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
104. See Staszewski, supra note 2, at 420-32 (discussing the role that private interest
groups play in the ballot initiative process and concluding that “the role of ‘the people’” is
secondary to the role of initiative experts in the formulation and passage of initiatives). See
generally CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING CALIFORNIA’S
FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 281-316 (2d ed. 2008) (examining the effect of private
money on the successfulness of ballot initiatives in California). In addition to utilizing a
spending campaign, proponents of ballot initiatives also work within the existing normative
framework to achieve their desired governance or policy goals. See MATTHEW MANWELLER,
THE PEOPLE VS. THE COURTS: INITIATIVE ELITES, JUDICIAL REVIEW, AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY
IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 75-80 (2005) (discussing how professional initiative drafters
are using judicial strategies and creating institutional support to advance their positions).
Utilizing mechanisms such as “grass-roots organization[ ], altering the language of measures
to meet current legal requirements, incrementalism, using previously upheld legal language,
keeping initiatives very short, drafting constitutional amendments rather than statutory
initiatives, ... judicial forum shopping, ... and drafting multiple versions of the same
initiative,” proponents wield a diverse range of political tools to achieve their legislative goals.
Id. at 65.
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separate costs associated with qualifying a measure to be placed on
the ballot as an initiative and lobbying for its passage suggest that
the system is susceptible to factioned interests dominating the
process.105 For instance, the median cost of qualifying a measure to
be placed on the ballot in 2006 was close to three million dollars, or
sixty-three times greater than comparable costs in 1976.106 The
numbers become even larger when examining the costs associated
with the special interest lobbying that accompanies these initia-
tives: in 2006, eight ballot initiatives garnished over three hundred
million dollars in support and opposition spending.107 Among the
largest contributors to these efforts—which amounted to almost
two-thirds of total spending in the ballot initiative process—were
energy companies, a Hollywood producer opposing the energy com-
panies, and tobacco companies.108 
The trend of special interests representing the predominant
financing source of ballot initiatives continued in 2009. Voters were
asked to vote on Proposition 16, an energy proposal, and Proposition
17, an insurance proposal. Each ballot initiative campaign was
almost entirely financed and sponsored by corporations looking to
close certain consumer-friendly loopholes in the law.109 The large
amount of money spent by special interests demonstrates the inher-
ent risk of factioned interests in a process that functions as a substi-
tute for legislative activities.110 Given Madison’s strong objections to
105. See Garrett & Gerber, supra note 21, at 74-75; cf. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct.
876 (2010) (striking down, on First Amendment grounds, a provision of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, which prohibited labor unions and corporations from
advertising for the election or defeat of a candidate within a certain number of days before an
election).
106. CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 104, at 11 tbl.4 (noting that the median
cost of qualifying a ballot initiative in California increased from $44,861 in 1976 to $2,848,259
in 2006). 
107. Id. at 283 tbl.8.1.
108. Id. at 288-89 tbl.8.4.
109. Pacific Gas & Electric supplied “98% of the $46 million in campaign financing” in
support of Proposition 16. Marc Lifsher, Props. 16 and 17 May Set Trend: If They Succeed,
More Firms Could Turn to the Ballot Box as an Easier Way To Change the Laws, L.A. TIMES,
June 5, 2010, at B1. Similarly, Mercury General Corporation supplied over 99 percent of the
$16 million Proposition 17 spending. Id. 
110. See Garrett & Gerber, supra note 21, at 75 (suggesting that well-funded special
interest groups may be able to “buy” an initiative based on the expensive process by which an
initiative is passed). This Note examines the reality of influence in the ballot initiative process
but does not argue against the inherent free speech or related First Amendment rights
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this type of influence in the legislative process, such lawmaking and
constitutional reformation driven by special interests raises con-
cerns regarding the viability of a republican government.
B. Structural Consequences of Unrestricted Ballot Initiatives
In addition to these pragmatic consequences, allowing ballot
initiatives to usurp the legislative function of a state also raises
structural governmental issues. Most notably, unfettered ballot
initiatives undermine the deliberative nature of a republican gov-
ernment. By emphasizing the value that deliberation brings to the
legislative process, the Framers thought a republican form of
governance would best serve the public good.111 Madison left no
question regarding the importance of permitting a deliberative
body—as opposed to direct citizen action—to govern when he wrote:
“it may well happen, that the public voice, pronounced by the
representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public
good, than if pronounced by the people themselves.”112 Ballot
initiatives by their nature, however, do not allow for this delibera-
tive process to occur:
The voters do not write the language of ballot measures; nor do
they typically engage in meaningful public debate about the
advisability of a proposed policy. With the possible exception of
unusually high-profile initiative elections, some voters may not
know anything about a measure prior to entering the voting
booth.... Even when the language of a ballot measure is pre-
sented to the electorate, many voters are unable to understand
the meaning of the legalese that is often used in the text. Nor
are they aware of the existing legal landscape or the likely
application of a measure to some later, unforeseen interpretive
controversy. Indeed, the most that can realistically be expected
associated with political speech in the process. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (holding that the First Amendment forbids restrictions on corporate
contributions to direct democratic measures such as ballot referendums).
111. See Victor Goldfeld, Note, Legislative Due Process and Simple Interest Group Politics:
Ensuring Minimal Deliberation Through Judicial Review of Congressional Processes, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 367, 376-79 (2004) (noting that “well-informed deliberation is the method likely
to further the public interest,” and that the role of special interests, or factions as Madison
called them, can be minimized best by legislative deliberation).
112. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 58.
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of voters is that they will grasp the broad purpose of an initia-
tive measure and vote either to approve or reject a general policy
based on their understanding of information gleaned from media
accounts, advertising, and ballot pamphlets.113
The treatment of direct democratic measures by courts such as
Rossi undermines this deliberative ideal.114 Referendums, which are
deliberated legislative measures put to the voters for mere approval,
are constitutionally prohibited from fundamental government
activities such as implementing tax measures for ordinary state
operations, calling elections, and passing “urgency statutes” in
California.115 Voter initiatives, however, have court approval to
address the essential government function of revenue-raising
legislation.116 The California court broadened, rather than limited,
the power of a nondeliberative legislative function, and in turn
provided a means by which “a party [may] do indirectly what the
Constitution prohibits doing directly.”117 Other courts have also
recognized the nondeliberative nature of ballot initiatives.118 In
these situations, when faced with a particular disposition that
would run contrary to the Framers’ ideals of government, courts
should embrace the essential government functions exception to the
application of direct democratic measures. In particular, when a
state decides to embrace a legislative function that governs without
deliberation in matters related to the fundamental governance of
the state, such as a direct ballot measure used to limit a legisla-
ture’s ability to raise revenue, courts must protect the value of
representation and the necessity of deliberation.119
113. Staszewski, supra note 2, at 431-32 (citations omitted).
114. Compare Rossi v. Brown, 889 P.2d 557, 560 (Cal. 1995) (noting that the initiative
power is a plenary legislative power reserved by the people), with Staszewski, supra note 2,
at 401-03 (discussing the importance of bicameral deliberation in the Framers’ governmental
design).
115. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 9(a).
116. See Rossi, 889 P.2d at 560-61.
117. Id. at 578 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
118. See, e.g., Duran v. Castro, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1126 n.6 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (“[T]he law
considered here is the result of the initiative process—a process not noted for careful and
deliberate consideration.”).
119. See Eule, supra note 10, at 1558-59 (arguing for courts to relax the presumption of
constitutionality for direct democratic measures, and stating that “when the people eschew
representation, courts need to protect the Constitution’s representational values”). 
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Looking to California again, history demonstrates that ballot
initiatives have been overwhelmingly used to circumvent the
legislature on matters of essential government importance. Since
California’s use of ballot initiatives became constitutional in 1911,120
40 percent of ballot initiatives approved by the voters have affected
revenue, taxation, bonds, or governmental/political processes.121 The
effects of these initiatives have significantly impacted the ability of
the legislature to govern the state. One commentator, for example,
estimated that one-third of California’s annual budget is tied to
mandatory appropriations as a direct result of ballot initiatives.122
Coupled with several constitutional provisions that restrain the
legislature’s ability to raise revenue, which were also passed by
ballot initiatives, it is clear that many of the fundamental functions
of California’s legislature have been either usurped or limited by
direct democratic mechanisms.123
C. The Essential Government Functions Exception
As discussed, the use of direct democratic measures in a legisla-
tive capacity produces fundamental structural consequences that
undermine the Framers’ clear intent to establish a republican
government.124 Ballot initiatives, being legislative measures passed
through a nonlegislative process, may also produce unintended
pragmatic consequences that hinder the governance of a state.125
Given the broad reach of these measures, a check on ballot initia-
tives is essential in preventing unintended consequences from
impeding the successful governance of a state. Indeed, even though
California has certain statutory constraints that limit the reach of
ballot initiatives, these restrictions are largely provisions address-
120. See Fisch, supra note 16, at 500.
121. See CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 104, at 7 tbl.3.
122. John G. Matsusaka, Have Voter Initiatives Paralyzed the California Budget? 1 (Univ.
of S. Cal. Law and Pub. Policy, Research Paper No. 03-24, 2004), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=476443.
123. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
124. See supra Part I.C.
125. See Kenneth P. Miller, Constraining Populism: The Real Challenge of Initiative
Reform, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1037, 1051-52 (2001) (describing the legislative process as
a “slow, careful, iterative, ... compromise-oriented” process that results in informed and
deliberate law making, and the initiative process, in comparison, as a “battering ram” that
“shortchange[s] deliberation and refinement”).
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ing the form—not the substance—of ballot initiatives and offer few
safeguards against the dangers that ballot initiatives pose to effec-
tive government.126
These structural problems can be remedied in two ways. First,
courts, representing a check on the legislature,127 could limit the
scope of ballot initiatives by striking down initiatives that interfere
with certain essential government functions.128 Although such action
would protect the structural model of the Framers’ chosen govern-
ment while at the same time limiting the negative pragmatic
consequences to state governance, it faces considerable obstacles.
The normative framework of state judicial institutions causes state
judges to hesitate before invalidating successful ballot initiatives
out of a fear that the people will unseat an unpopular judge in an
upcoming judicial election.129 Judges may also fear being labeled as
an activist.130 Moreover, without any justification beyond the
Framers’ vision of the structural separation of powers inherent in
republicanism, judges may confront precedent that prevents them
from striking down ballot initiatives that affect essential govern-
ment functions.131
The second, more realistic way to guard against the dangers of
ballot initiatives is for state legislatures to utilize existing govern-
mental procedures to amend state constitutions to limit the scope of
ballot initiatives. For example, California could amend the ballot
initiative provisions of its constitution to be in accord with its
126. See supra Part II.B.
127. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 424-31.
128. See Friedelbaum, supra note 27, at 1023.
129. Bea Ann Smith, Alarming Attacks on Judges: Time To Defend Our Constitutional
Trustees, 80 OR. L. REV. 587, 606 (2001) (“[T]he judge who strikes down an initiative faces a
highly and well-funded group ready to unseat him at the next opportunity.... The populist
movement that bred initiatives threatens to impose even more direct pressure on judges who
reject their proposals.”).
130. See Fiebig, supra note 89, at 133 (discussing criticisms of California judges for
perceived judicial activism).
131. See Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912) (holding that the ballot
initiative process in Oregon was a nonjusticiable political question when litigants raised a
Guarantee Clause challenge); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 56 (1849) (holding that
Guarantee Clause claims are nonjusticiable political questions). But see New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 185 (1992) (suggesting “that perhaps not all claims under the Guarantee
Clause present nonjusticiable questions”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee
Clause Should Be Justiciable, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 849, 851-52 (1994); Berg, supra note 31, at
209.
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provisions limiting referendums.132 This change would exempt
subject matter relating to urgency matters, tax matters, or “usual
current expenses of the State” from being implemented by way of a
ballot initiative.133 In this sense, California could be a model for
other states to emulate in limiting ballot initiatives and ensuring
that the governance of the state remains consistent with the
republican framework set forth by the Framers.
D. The Importance of the Guarantee Clause in Judicial Review of
Ballot Initiatives
When addressing ballot initiatives from a structural perspective,
courts play an important role in ensuring that the Framers’ repub-
lican spirit is preserved.134 This Note is not arguing that courts
should hold certain ballot initiatives unconstitutional as a vio-
lation of the Guarantee Clause, although some commentators have
advocated making the Guarantee Clause a justiciable question.135
Instead, this Note follows the logic of Hans Linde, former Justice of
the Oregon Supreme Court, who argued that the Constitution, as
the supreme law of the land, imposes a duty on the states to
“maintain republican forms of government.”136 This duty, which he
characterized as the “most fundamental duty in American public
law,” belongs to both state officials and judges.137
In order to preserve the Framers’ republican ideals, courts need
not rely upon a violation of the Guarantee Clause. A judicial stand-
ard that honors the intent of the Framers, particularly their intent
that both federal and state governments adhere to a republican
form of government,138 is attainable through an essential govern-
ment functions exception. A central danger that direct democratic
132. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. Ironically, amending the California
Constitution to limit the substantive reach of ballot initiatives could be accomplished by using
a ballot initiative.
133. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 9(a) (restricting the subject matter of the state referendum
power).
134. See Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not “Republican Government”: The
Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19, 39-40 (1993). 
135. See Berg, supra note 31; Chemerinsky, supra note 131.
136. Linde, supra note 134, at 39-40. 
137. Id.
138. See supra Part I.
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measures pose to the republican form of government is the danger
presented by factions and simple majority rule. As Madison
famously warned, “[w]hen a majority is included in a faction, the
form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to
sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest, both the public good and
the rights of other citizens.”139 A ballot initiative, as a legislative
instrument, presents the same danger: a system of pure majori-
tariansim.140 One of the most famous instances of a court’s check on
the majoritarianism of a ballot initiative was Romer v. Evans.141
Although the Court overturned the law at issue on equal protection
grounds,142 it also demonstrated the ability of courts to honor the
Framers’ desire for a republican style of legislating in order to
protect the rights of minorities at the hands of majoritarian and
factioned powers. 
Although courts need not rely on the Guarantee Clause to inval-
idate a ballot initiative that interferes with essential government
functions, the Guarantee Clause can provide courts with guidance.
Courts readily acknowledge that the process of interpreting ballot
initiatives requires the initiative to be within constitutional
constraints and consistent with the intent of the Framers.143 Of
central concern to the necessity of a republican government is the
protection against the dangers that factions pose to legislative
activities.144 The essential government functions exemption to direct
democratic subject matter is necessary in order to prevent such
factioned interests from abusing their majority position at the
expense of minority interests.145
139. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 57.
140. See MANWELLER, supra note 104, at 192.
141. 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down an amendment to the Colorado Constitution,
passed by voter initiative, that forbade localities from including homosexuals in any protected
class). 
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., Zingale v. Powell, 885 So. 2d 277, 282 (Fla. 2004).
144. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
145. See Eule, supra note 10, at 1558-59 (“[C]ourts must pick up the slack and ensure that
the majority governs in the interests of the whole people.”).
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CONCLUSION
As the current California Chief Justice recently noted, continued
reliance on ballot initiatives for matters that are paramount to the
successful governance of a state “shall continue [the state] on a
course of dysfunctional state government, characterized by a lack of
accountability on the part of our officeholders as well as the voting
public.”146 This cautionary statement regarding the dangers of
governance by ballot initiative reiterates the message of this Note:
the Framers chose a republican system of government and rejected
a direct democratic system.147 Continued reliance on unfettered
ballot initiatives could, as John Adams foretold, subject the voter
initiative mechanism to the common fate of most pure democracies
—one in which direct governance subjects the government to an
inability to govern properly.148 
The essential government functions exception to ballot initiatives
preserves the Framers’ intent to implement a republican style of
government in the states—best reflected in the Guarantee Clause149
—by preserving the governance attributes that are most threatened
by widespread use of ballot initiatives. Not only do ballot initiatives
discourage the legislative deliberation that the Framers valued,
they also subject the governance of a state to the dangers of
factionalism.150 By excluding essential government functions from
the reach of direct democracy, as the California Constitution does in
the case of state referendums on taxation,151 the structural and
philosophical framework of a republican state government is
strengthened by the forced reliance on the ideals of deliberation,
representative governance, and governance from the greatest diver-
sity of interests.152 Apart from the structural governance advantages
of exempting certain types of subject matter from ballot initiatives,
the exception prevents the pragmatic consequences that result when
146. Chief Justice George, supra note 9.
147. Id.
148. Id. (analogizing California’s current reliance on ballot initiatives for governance to
John Adams’s warning that “democracy never lasts long” and that “[t]here is never a
democracy that did not commit suicide”).
149. See supra Part I.
150. See supra Part III.A.2.
151. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 9(a).
152. See supra Part I.
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a legislature’s hands are symbolically tied during times of state
fiscal crisis.
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